CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.693
31 January 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND NINETY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 31 January 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Alessandro Vattani (Italy)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 693rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament and the first part of the 1995 session.

It is a pleasure for me to open the work of the Conference for a year which everybody agrees will be crucial for the disarmament enterprise, in the presence of my country's Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Mr. Walter Gardini, to whom I extend a warm welcome among us on behalf of all of you. Ambassador Gardini has recorded outstanding progress through the stages of an exemplary diplomatic career which culminated in his appointment as Director-General for Political Affairs at the Farnesina. In that post, in particular, he gave decisive impetus to the cause of security, arms control and disarmament at a crucial time in international relations. Finally, Ambassador Gardini occupied the post of Ambassador of Italy in Paris with competence and distinction. It is significant that one of his first official engagements since his appointment as a member of the Italian Government involves this forum. His presence among us today therefore bears witness to the priority which Italy gives to arms control and disarmament and the importance it attaches to our Conference.

I would also like, on my own behalf and on behalf of the Conference, to welcome the Deputy Director of the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Ambassador Ralph Earle, who will be addressing the Conference. I am sure that his statement will be followed with much interest by the Conference.

As you are aware, our colleague and friend Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil has been promoted to the rank of Minister for Foreign Affairs of his country. This appointment is certainly to the advantage of his country, but it is also a loss for our Conference. Over and above the talent and elegance with which he represented his country, Ambassador Lampreia also worked with devotion and competence to find a solution to the thorny question of the expansion of the Conference. I am sure that I am faithfully reflecting your feelings when I wish him every success in his new functions. I therefore request the Brazilian delegation to be kind enough to pass on our good wishes to Ambassador Lampreia.

I would also like to welcome the new representative of Myanmar, Ambassador Aye, to the Conference and to promise him our full cooperation.

I call upon the Under-Secretary of State, Ambassador Gardini, to make his statement.

Mr. GARDINI (Italy) (translated from French): It is an honour for Italy to take up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at the start of the 1995 session, at a moment which is crucial for the future of this forum, as well as for disarmament and arms control prospects. Let me first of all assure you that the Italian delegation will spare no efforts in discharging this responsibility, but in order to do so it will need the vital cooperation of all delegations.

I wish to thank those who occupied the Chair of the Conference during the 1994 session. I also acknowledge the presence of

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Ambassador Vladimir Petrovsky, the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, whom we had the pleasure of receiving a few days ago in Rome, and Mr. Bensmail, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference. Their valuable and decisive contributions will be highly appreciated, as they have been in the past.

We all realize the great significance of the present political situation, which appears to us to be conducive to the attainment of the fundamental aims of the Conference on Disarmament, thus maintaining its credibility. After the welcome conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention, new important tasks in the field of disarmament have been assigned to this negotiating body. The great diplomatic skills and the technical expertise possessed by the members of the Conference on Disarmament, the long hours of negotiation, our financial efforts, must all now produce tangible results. This is not the moment or the place to embark on an academic exercise, and I shall therefore spare you an enumeration of the positive results, of which you are all aware, that have been achieved over the past few years in all fields of disarmament, and especially in nuclear disarmament. The bilateral agreements concluded and the undertakings entered into unilaterally in this regard by the major nuclear Powers are unprecedented and we should appreciate the acceleration of the disarmament process which we have recently witnessed. The dramatic reductions in these weapons and the prospect of further reductions will certainly have positive effects on the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Of course we cannot, as we say in Italy, "rest on our laurels". We cannot content ourselves with passively observing, with a feeling of self-satisfaction, the results we have achieved so far. We have important deadlines to meet and our parliaments, as well as public opinion in each of our countries, are expecting greater world stability stemming from reduced quantities of armaments.

It is well known that the Italian Government has advocated, in the European Union, in NATO, in the "Group of 7 + 1" and in the OSCE, the unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT, to which at this historic juncture it attaches high priority. Moreover, the European Union has decided, in accordance with the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, to undertake "joint action" to achieve this goal. We are pursuing this goal because, to quote from the French EU presidential statement at the last session of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of States parties to the NPT, we believe that a world without the NPT or with a weakened NPT would be dangerous for all, and particularly for countries experiencing tensions or crises. We believe that this treaty is a cornerstone of international peace and stability in the world today, and no effort should be spared to make it a permanent feature of our international environment.

I do not wish to be pretentious, but let me say that in making these remarks, Italy - I am convinced - can claim special credibility. It is well known that 25 years ago, my country hesitated to accede to the NPT. Hence it was no accident that the Parliament ratified this instrument five years after its entry into force. If today we are advocating its unconditional and indefinite extension, it is precisely because throughout these past 25 years, we have become convinced of its great value and its fundamental contribution to the stability of international security.

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The Conference on Disarmament has a significant role to play in this field. The negotiations that you are to undertake will be greatly instrumental in establishing an environment conducive to the unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT.

A few remarks on the issue of nuclear testing. Never have international circumstances been so propitious to the speedy conclusion of the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty: most of the nuclear-weapon States have unilaterally declared moratoriums on their nuclear testing. We warmly welcome these decisions, which, we hope, will attain general and indefinite status. Moreover, the number of nuclear warheads and their means of delivery have dramatically decreased and the international community has become increasingly aware of the fact that horizontal proliferation has superseded vertical proliferation as a major threat. If a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is to be effective and compliance with its provisions is to be assured, it must be provided with a "minimum threshold of credibility" in terms of verification, as well as a rational structure in terms of cost-effectiveness. The Conference, conscious of the prime importance of these basic concepts, has already expressed - at its last session - its unanimous intention to concentrate its efforts on these negotiations in order to overcome the remaining difficulties. We appreciate the skill displayed by the ad hoc technical and scientific groups, as a result of which progress was achieved in refining the technical criteria for negotiations which, in their final stage, will be essentially of a political nature.

I share the view expressed by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Klaus Kinkel, in introducing his 10-point initiative on non-proliferation policy, to the effect that the success of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty could make a decisive contribution to creating a climate conductive to the indefinite extension of the NPT. The Conference's allocation of the largest possible amount of time available to these negotiations does not mean that it should leave aside and slacken its attention to the other items on its traditional programme of work. I refer first and foremost to the consultations being held in order to agree upon a mandate which will open the way for negotiations on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear-weapon purposes (a "cut-off"). Such a treaty would limit the equipment available for producing nuclear explosives and could bring nuclear programmes under international control. By accepting a commitment to prohibit the production of fissile material, States would demonstrate their real intention to gradually abandon programmes of nuclear research for military purposes. It is a fact that stockpiles of fissile material now exceed needs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. On the issue of the scope of the mandate for a subsidiary body to be entrusted with these negotiations, the concern of some members of the Conference is well known. It is our duty, despite these difficulties, to seek a compromise in order to achieve the necessary consensus. In this regard I wish to pay tribute to Ambassador Gerald Shannon, the Special Coordinator, who made every effort to achieve the objective set by the United Nations General Assembly in the resolution it adopted on this topic at its forty-eighth session. We are grateful to him for his commitment to identifying a common denominator in the light of the positions expressed by the delegations during his consultations.

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We cannot overlook other important issues that have been before the Conference for a long time, in particular the issue of "negative security assurances", which should be developed in conformity with the expectations that are taking shape within the framework of the concept of collective security. These expectations are upheld by many countries which, by becoming parties to and complying with the NPT, have already demonstrated their commitment to contributing to the containment of nuclear proliferation. Hence this willingness should be taken into account and we should be ready to compensate these countries politically for the confidence they have demonstrated by acceding to an agreement whose effective application is one of the pillars of the collective security system. The appeal launched by the General Assembly in a recent resolution on the issue of security assurances should prompt us to redouble our efforts to finalize appropriate agreements in this field.

Turning to the Ad Hoc Committee on "transparency in armaments", I would like to recall resolution 49/75 C adopted by the General Assembly. It is my hope that the fact that this resolution was supported by a majority of States will persuade those countries which, in abstaining, expressed their reservations on this point, not to ignore the urgent need to explore this topic relating to conventional weapons, a topic which helps to maintain a balance in the Conference's activities, while preventing it from confining itself to nuclear issues alone. It is well known that the many causes of bloodshed in conflicts in several regions of the world, and the perception that a nuclear confrontation would be unthinkable, lead us to pay due attention to conventional weapons. Resort to conventional weapons in regional conflicts is sometimes no less fearsome and insidious than resort to weapons of mass destruction. It is therefore necessary to discard the pretexts which could hold up progress in this direction and identify practical objectives whose achievement, in parallel with the reduction of nuclear armaments, will avert as far as possible the risk of the use of force as a means of settling disputes between States. Progress in this sector should go hand in hand with that achieved following the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, to which, moreover, it is desirable for all States to contribute.

In referring to conventional weapons I do not wish to overlook the issue of anti-personnel mines. This problem has been considered so far essentially from a humanitarian viewpoint. An important meeting was held in Geneva at the beginning of this month in order to prepare for the conference to review the Convention on "inhumane" weapons which will take place in the autumn of this year. A few days ago Italy deposited the instruments of ratification of this important Convention. Moreover, last September at the General Assembly of the United Nations Italy announced the adoption of a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines. We are therefore witnessing interesting developments in this sector and, apart from the progress made from the humanitarian perspective, the issue is increasingly falling within the framework of conventional disarmament. In this regard we listened with interest to, and we share, the thoughts expressed by President Clinton at the last United Nations General Assembly when he called on other countries to join with the United States and conclude an agreement to reduce the number and availability of these mines. An appropriate framework for the negotiation

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of such an agreement might be found in this forum by favouring the desirable balance between conventional and non-conventional disarmament.

Turning to the broad area of "prevention of an arms race in outer space", we must continue our efforts - as urged by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution last year - to secure a convergence of views on proposals aimed at assuring the peaceful use of outer space. Far from claiming to have found permanent solutions - which would fail to take account of the inevitability of technical progress - appropriate solutions must be sought to keep pace with scientific developments and avoid any negative consequences for international security. In this regard the prospects for an agreement on confidence-building measures should not be underestimated, as this would provide an initial result whose considerable value has already been demonstrated in practice and by history.

Another pending problem of great political significance which needs to be solved without delay is the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament. Its restricted present membership no longer reflects the international situation which has taken shape following the end of the cold war. We therefore have an inescapable obligation to re-examine the problem and seek solutions which are politically acceptable. The credibility of the Conference and the results it is pursuing, such as the CTBT and the halt to the production of fissile material, will also depend on the representative nature of the body which has negotiated these treaties. In the past two years commendable efforts have been made to reach an acceptable compromise with a view to ensuring the expansion of the Conference. Experience already acquired in this field, in our opinion, remains the basis for any other initiative in this respect.

Italy is fully aware of the responsibility falling to it as it occupies the Chair of the Conference at the crucial time of planning its work, which will determine the progress to be made in all the negotiations. We therefore count on the support and cooperation of all delegations in this endeavour. Italy has always sought to play a role of mediation in the most varied and complex situations. In doing so our country does not seek advantages. The objective we seek is one in which the international community can succeed in establishing a stable international environment.

Allow me to conclude by underlining the importance we attach to the work of the Conference. We are well aware of the valuable results which through past decades have been achieved by this body under its various names. Important treaties which serve as the foundations of world stability and the maintenance of peace such as the "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water", the "non-proliferation Treaty", the "Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons" and more recently the "Convention on chemical weapons" have been negotiated within these walls. You have the privilege of enjoying great autonomy in your negotiations while avoiding the excessive attentions of the international media. This autonomy is a clear indication of the trust that your Governments place in you in the area of national security, which throughout history has been a restricted area of State sovereignty. I am convinced that when dealing with security, the room for negotiation is extremely narrow. It is up to you - and this is a great responsibility - to judge the scope of the

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compromises you can accept. It is also your duty not to be caught within the limits of your own procedures and in the comfort of daily routine. Our Governments, our public opinion, our media, want to understand the substance of the issues you are negotiating, and I believe it is a duty for each of us to be as transparent as we can, even in dealing with the complex, difficult and sensitive issues which fall within the competence of the Conference on Disarmament. Hence I cannot but emphasize once again that the months ahead will be of crucial importance. Your deliberations can have a major influence on the climate, the environment for the NPT extension conference. I assure you that the Italian Government has every confidence in your capabilities, and that in the Chair of this body we shall spare no effort in helping to pave the way to the most concrete results in the course of the session I have the honour to open today.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Under-Secretary of State for his declaration.

The consultations I have held on organizational matters lead me to believe that we will no doubt shortly be able to undertake work on questions of substance. Once we have heard the speakers on the list for today in plenary I shall invite the Conference to examine rapidly in an informal meeting the requests for participation by non-member States of the Conference in our work. On that occasion I hope to inform you of the results of my many consultations which have led me to put before you a draft Presidential statement on the agenda and the organization of our session, which the secretariat distributed at the beginning of our meeting. I hope that this draft will meet with the necessary consensus, because it reflects our common recognition of the urgency of resuming negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and the priority which all of us attach to these negotiations. It is my firm hope that this consensus will lead to the re-establishment of the Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban as soon as possible, while our consultations continue on the other pending items. Immediately after that we will resume the plenary meeting to give official confirmation to the agreement of the members of the Conference to the requests for participation by non-member States. This afternoon and tomorrow I shall intensively pursue my consultations with the members on all pending organizational questions, so that we can start our substantive work as of next Thursday.

I now call upon Mr. Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to read us a message addressed to us by Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): I have the honour to read out the following message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Conference on Disarmament.

"I welcome this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament once again. I hardly need to underline the significance of this year for the United Nations in general and for the cause of arms regulation and disarmament in particular. The celebration of the

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fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations provides us with an opportunity to assess our past achievements and our setbacks, to draw the necessary lessons from them, and to elaborate a sound response to the challenges ahead of us. I am confident that your Conference, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, will continue to make its contribution to this process.

"I have, on a number of occasions, most recently at the last session of the First Committee of the General Assembly, stressed the importance of maintaining and even increasing the momentum created by the recent positive developments in the field of arms regulation and disarmament. Our common efforts to stop the flow of arms and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction acquire even greater significance in the context of an increasing number of regional and subregional conflicts. It is indeed a source of satisfaction that the process of international cooperation in the field of disarmament was enhanced in the past two years.

"The recent accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons represents a most welcome development. Together with the ratifications by Belarus and Kazakhstan, it will permit the entry into force of the START I Treaty, auguring well for the rapid ratification and entry into force of the START II Treaty. Thus, further progress in the reduction of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation is no longer beyond the reach of reality. I believe that this will enable other nuclear-weapon States to move the process of nuclear disarmament forward and make yet another contribution to the establishment of a safer world. I also welcome the satisfactory solution of the problem between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and IAEA with regard to the implementation of the former's commitments under the safeguards agreements. The agreement reached between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States in this connection encourages the restoration of conditions of peace, security and stability in the whole region.

"The past few years have also witnessed other positive, welcome developments which have highlighted the increased interaction between the global and regional dimension of arms control and disarmament. In this context, I am encouraged by the progress achieved by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, as well as by the efforts of the States of Latin America and the Caribbean in the process of further consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

"It is my earnest hope that the Middle East peace process, which has already substantially contributed to the easing of tensions among States in the region, will be further enhanced and that it will soon

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result in a peaceful solution to outstanding problems, thereby setting the stage for the establishment of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction.

"The contribution of the Conference on Disarmament to the attainment of our common goals cannot be overemphasized. Your agenda includes items of paramount importance for the furtherance of these objectives. In 1993, the General Assembly unanimously supported the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, thus providing the Conference on Disarmament with a strong political commitment as it embarked on this priority task. While recognizing the draft treaty text that emerged from your endeavours so far, I hardly need to underline that fundamental issues remain unresolved. Given the significant impact of this treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, on the process of nuclear disarmament and on the enhancement of international peace and security, I would urge you to spare no effort to strive for an early consensus on these important, unresolved issues as a matter of urgency.

"I note with satisfaction that there is no objection, in the Conference on Disarmament, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. I recognize the difficulties with regard to a common approach acceptable to all; nevertheless, I appeal to all States to explore all possible avenues to resolve any outstanding issue. Such a solution should, in my view, fully take into account the legitimate demands of non-nuclear-weapon States for stronger international and legally binding security assurances and the equally important requirement that those States pledge to fully and unconditionally renounce the possession and acquisition of nuclear weapons.

"The consensus on the important initiative on banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices must be preserved. You have already made a step forward by agreeing that the Conference constitutes the appropriate forum for the negotiation of a treaty on this issue. I hope that the ongoing consultations will soon lead to the start of formal negotiations on such a treaty.

"The prevention of an arms race in outer space has been on your agenda since 1982. While recognizing the existence of serious conceptual differences among members of the Conference on the final objectives to be achieved in this field, I feel confident that the number of proposals and ideas before you, aimed at filling in the gaps in the existing legal regime governing space activities, provide a valuable basis for developing confidence-building measures which would achieve a high degree of transparency in space activities and ensure that outer space is used for the benefit of all mankind.

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"The emphasis on arms regulation and disarmament in the nuclear field is legitimate. Nevertheless, the negative impact of uncontrolled conventional arms transfers for international security also deserves to be vigorously addressed. We should bear in mind that ongoing conflicts are being fought with conventional weapons, exacting a heavy toll and causing untold human suffering. Therefore, openness and transparency in military matters are essential to enhance confidence and trust among States, to help dissipate suspicions, and to contribute to global and regional stability. The Register of Conventional Arms is an important element in our collective effort to promote transparency. I am confident that your Conference has not entirely exhausted its potential in the field of transparency in armaments and I would therefore urge you to continue your efforts to develop universal and non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency, capable of responding to the objectives of promoting confidence among States and paving the way for a more secure world with less reliance on weapons. I do not underestimate the difficulties inherent in this task, but I trust that your endeavours will take us a step forward in this direction.

"I am aware of your continuing efforts aimed at bringing the agenda of the Conference up to date and to adapt it to present-day realities, and I hope that they will soon be successful. Finally, I urge you to complete without delay the work to expand the membership of the Conference so that it will reflect the profoundly changed international political balances.

"Your Conference has, in the past, proven that it is capable of rising to the challenges before it. I sincerely hope that your endeavours will result in further progress in the international disarmament agenda during this crucial year.

"I wish you success in your negotiations."

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for passing on the message from Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. I would ask Mr. Petrovsky to be kind enough to convey to the Secretary-General of the United Nations our appreciation for his contribution and for the importance he attaches to our work.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has also sent me a communication transmitting the text of the resolutions and decisions on disarmament which the General Assembly adopted at its forty-ninth session. This communication has been distributed by the secretariat as document CD/1288.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mexico and the United States of America. I give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, please accept the warm congratulations of the delegation of Mexico, which pledges its cooperation in this initial phase of the Conference on Disarmament's annual session. We would like to place on record our appreciation to Ambassador Sirous Nasseri for the manner in which he conducted our work in the last phase of 1994. We welcome Mr. Petrovsky, the Secretary-General of the Conference, and his Deputy, Mr. Bensmail, and we extend a warm welcome to Under-Secretary Gardini of Italy and Ambassador Earle of the United States of America. Likewise we would like to greet our new colleague from Myanmar, and allow me, Mr. President, through the distinguished representative of Brazil to express our wishes to Ambassador Lampreia for every success in his new and important functions.

In a few months I will leave Geneva. I hope, therefore, that my colleagues will allow me to express some thoughts on a priority issue in the field of disarmament and international security - the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a subject that we should examine in depth in this forum to which I came for the first time 25 years ago. I apologize for the length of this statement and the fact that some passages may perhaps be somewhat repetitious for some of you who were in New York last week.

States do not often have the opportunity to sit down and examine together issues of fundamental importance for the well-being of all. Like the United Nations General Assembly's special sessions devoted to specific items or world conferences on various topics, the 1995 Conference for the review and extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is one such rare occasion. But it is different from the other NPT review conferences and other conferences sponsored by the United Nations in that its results will have a direct impact on the question of nuclear weapons for decades to come. What we do next spring in New York - and especially what we fail to accomplish in New York - will shape or reshape the manner in which the international community approaches nuclear non-proliferation. But let us not exaggerate. To begin with, although there are tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, they are in the hands of relatively few countries, a number much lower than some imagined in the 1950s when non-proliferation concerns moved up the list of international priorities. Then one heard the arguments about nuclear power, the dangers of living in a world where there were 20 or 30 nuclear-weapon States. Happily that has not happened. Today almost 170 nations are committed, in legally binding instruments such as the NPT or the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. And that is very significant. To "go nuclear" is a decision that not too many countries want to take. In most, reason has prevailed. Canada, for instance, decided to forgo the nuclear option from the very dawn of the nuclear age. Others, such as Sweden, remained undecided until the NPT put an end to an internal debate in the 1960s. Some, such as Germany or Japan, probably never had a choice, because of constitutional constraints.

Instead of a proliferation of nuclear players, what has occurred is an incredible accumulation of nuclear arms in five countries, especially the United States and the former Soviet Union. Initially that build-up was

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uncontrolled; later, after the SALT agreements of the 1970s, it was more orderly and almost predictable. And a central element of the nuclear arms race was the testing of weapons and weapons systems.

At first, nuclear testing was chaotic, haphazard and very unfriendly to the environment. The enormous mushroom clouds of the late 1940s and the 1950s embodied the power and the terror which the nuclear age inspired around the globe. Those atmospheric tests also became the focus of a broad-based worldwide movement to ban nuclear weapons. That movement has continued for decades with its ups and downs. The intensity of the cold war seemed at times to wear it down. The move to underground testing, after the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, also reduced the visibility of the nuclear threat. For some, it was "out of sight, out of mind". Others persisted and the fear of the nuclear menace and its proliferation moved individuals, communities and nations to do what they could. Cities, towns, neighbourhoods and even single homes were declared nuclear-free. After 1959 Antarctica was to remain totally demilitarized and in Latin America and the Caribbean the Treaty of Tlatelolco was concluded in 1967, banning nuclear weapons and securing a formal, legally binding commitment from the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the States of the region. The Treaty of Rarotonga in 1985 followed, covering the South Pacific, and Africa will very soon gain nuclear-weapon-free status.

In 1968 the NPT was concluded. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to it promise to remain just that - non-nuclear. In return the Treaty encourages the transfer of nuclear technology for civilian purposes, including the benefits to be derived from peaceful nuclear explosions. Even more importantly, the nuclear-weapon States (the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union at first, and China and France in recent years) agreed to move towards nuclear disarmament, including both quantitative and qualitative measures. A comprehensive test-ban treaty has long been considered the most important of such measures. Unlike other multilateral treaties, the NPT is not of indefinite duration. Many of the principal countries to which it was addressed (Germany, Italy, Japan and Switzerland) insisted on a short duration, a kind of trial period, as well as periodic review conferences, in order to ensure that the nuclear-weapon States would disarm before making their own non-nuclear-weapon status permanent. This is the reason for the provisions of articles X.2 and VIII.3, and for this year's review and extension conference.

Why are the nuclear-weapon States so reluctant to begin a genuine process of nuclear disarmament? It is largely due to the inertia of old habits, habits developed over decades. But in part it is also because of the fear of losing their status, a status they deny others. In fact it might be said that the last to proliferate - the last to "go nuclear" - became an ardent proponent of horizontal non-proliferation. This was true of the United States after 1945, then the Soviet Union, then the United Kingdom after 1952, then France and finally China. The nuclear-weapon States are wrong on both counts. Initially, they attempted to rationalize their possession of nuclear weapons because of the cold war. Now that the cold war is over, they speak of unforeseen threats. They say they need nuclear weapons "just in case". But

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why are their so-called national security needs more important than those of others? Why do they insist, as adults to children, that the rest of the world should "do as I say, not as I do"?

Until the 1970s, nuclear testing was a clear indication that a country had acquired a nuclear-weapon capability. Today that is no longer the case. One can manufacture a relatively reliable device without having to test it. Testing becomes important only if one wants to continue to improve bomb designs or to embark on the production of large numbers of weapons. Their price tag is such that their quality - i.e. their reliability - must be confirmed through testing before production begins. Aside from the five states that have been testing for decades, it seems difficult to identify another nation that would want to test today. The example of India is clear: it tested a so-called peaceful nuclear device in 1974. If testing is so important, why has it not continued to test? Testing certainly played (and, in some cases, continues to play) a major role in the improvement of the nuclear arsenals (their militarization and precision) and related nuclear-weapon technologies such as computer simulation. And because of the latter, among other reasons, the United States and the Russian Federation have decided to halt testing in what one could describe as the traditional way. Testing by explosions has lost much of its value, at least in those two countries, precisely because of scientific and technological advances in the field of computer simulation and so-called laboratory experiments. Hence their unilateral moratoriums and hence also their call for a CTBT. What is occurring now with regard to nuclear testing, is no different from what has been happening in the disarmament field for years: the technologically more advanced nations reach a point where they can discard a certain weapon or weapon-related activity and then they move to ban that weapon or activity for the rest of the world through a multilateral treaty. This was the case with bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons in the late 1960s and chemical weapons after the Gulf war demonstrated to the United States military that a large army, even one purportedly equipped with weapons of mass destruction, was no match for high-tech conventional weapons. The United States concluded that it did not need chemical weapons, and the corollary was obvious: no one else should have them. After years of foot-dragging, the United States suddenly insisted that the CD should conclude as quickly as possible the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. The Convention was opened for signature in January 1993.

By the early 1960s the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had perfected underground testing to such a degree that they were able to stop testing in the atmosphere and quickly codified this step in the PTBT. This treaty was preceded by a moratorium on testing from 1958 to 1961 which was followed by several rounds of tests, primarily atmospheric in the case of the USSR, from late 1961 to 1963. Moreover, the United States Senate agreed to ratify the PTBT only on the condition that the United States would pursue an "aggressive" underground testing programme, maintain modern nuclear laboratory facilities and the required personnel and preserve an "atmospheric testing capability". France, which first tested in 1960, and China, which would begin testing in 1964, never joined the PTBT, although years later, when they had acquired an underground testing capability, they declared that they would also abide by the PTBT's provisions.

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In the early 1990s, the same pattern is being repeated. The more advanced nuclear-weapon States are ready to ban traditional underground testing. They insist, however, on maintaining both an "underground testing capability" in case they wish to resume testing and the possibility of very low-yield (hydronuclear) tests and other testing-related activities. For their part, China and France appear to need a few more underground tests in order to miniaturize their arsenals and to acquire a computer simulation capability respectively. China is proceeding with its programme, whereas France will decide whether or not to resume testing only after the national elections in May 1995.

By a quirk of fate, the international community finds itself negotiating a CTBT on the eve of the NPT Conference. The link which was built into the NPT between its 25-year duration and nuclear disarmament measures (art. VI), a link which many have always recognized, is now more obvious and stronger than ever. To be sure, some countries are currently still in a state of denial. They argue that there is no such link and that each step - the NPT's indefinite and unconditional extension and the conclusion of a CTBT - should be considered on its own merits. They insist that one should not be "held hostage" by the other. The fact is that this link does exist. The negotiating history of the NPT proves this. Moreover, the NPT has, in actual fact, been held hostage. However, those responsible for this situation are not the advocates of a CTBT and nuclear disarmament but the nuclear-weapon States themselves by continuing to increase and refine their nuclear arsenals. And it is ironic that they should be the most enthusiastic supporters of the NPT's indefinite and unconditional extension.

Some will say that in recent years there has been much progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. Some will even recite a litany of measures taken, especially by the United States and the Russian Federation. They will add that, although the total number of nuclear warheads is today still greater than it was in 1970 (when the NPT entered into force), their power in kilotons is much smaller. But it is not a simple question of numbers. It is rather how the nuclear-weapon States view their nuclear weapons and how we non-nuclear States view the nuclear-weapon States. The real issue is far more important and goes to the very heart of the question of the kind of world we want our children and grandchildren to live in. Are we ready to accept a world where nuclear weapons are a permanent feature, or do we want their existence to have been a fleeting moment in history? Do we seek a nuclear-weapon-free world or will we accept that for the foreseeable future we will have the five so-called acknowledged nuclear-weapon States and a host of others in the making?

Today the situation regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is rather complicated. The technology for their manufacture has been improving and what was once a monopoly of one, later two, three and eventually five nations is now within the reach of others. What you invent today to enhance your security has a tendency to reappear later elsewhere as a threat. The development of new and more sophisticated weapons and weapons systems has a way of bommeranging. They seem to offer security until they are developed by

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others. The cycle then repeats itself. Some forget that the world was once a nuclear-weapon-free zone. And the goal should be to return to that status as soon as possible.

How did seemingly rational human beings end up justifying the acquisition, use and continued development of these weapons of mass destruction? In the mid-1940s United States efforts to build an atomic bomb were viewed in the context of a crusade against the Axis Powers. By the summer of 1945, however, the war had ended in Europe and was about to end in the Pacific. None the less the bomb was tested in July and used in August. At that moment the relationship to the "ultimate weapon" changed in the United States and elsewhere. Incredible as it seems, the bomb became acceptable to leaders in many nations. The cold war would only serve to obfuscate the moral argument. But what would they have said had Nazi Germany and not the United States acquired the bomb first? They would probably speak of "an evil weapon in evil hands". One need only recall the West's reaction to the Soviet Union's first nuclear-weapon test in 1949. In short, there was no legal or moral justification for acquiring and using atomic weapons then, and there is none today.

Two hundred years ago the world faced a similar moral dilemma. The odious institution of slavery, though upheld and defended by many, came under increasing attack and by the end of the nineteenth century it had been abolished almost completely. Today no one would dare to defend it; it seems so foreign to our shared values. But slavery was in fact upheld by political leaders, just as there are those today who defend the possession of nuclear weapons and their possible use. It is necessary, therefore, for the entire international community to recommit itself today to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This would have been a lot easier years ago. Today one must contend with a growing variety of situations. First, there are the five nuclear-weapon States; then for a time we had three de facto nuclear-weapon States (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine). There is also one ex-nuclear-weapon State (South Africa); three so-called threshold States (India, Israel and Pakistan); two that are no longer considered threshold States (Argentina and Brazil); and a number of countries that have the technology, the fissile material and the financial resources to "go nuclear" in a matter of months. The nuclear-weapon States should set an example and pave the way towards nuclear disarmament. They should put forward a comprehensive nuclear disarmament programme. They should begin by committing themselves to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by a given date. Then they should identify concrete steps to reduce the nuclear threat, and adopt them, again within a specific time-frame. Finally, they should identify those nuclear disarmament measures which they could take unilaterally, bilaterally, with other nuclear-weapon States and multilaterally within a given period or periods (5 or 10 years, for example). This would have a most beneficial effect on the way the non-nuclear-weapon States view the relationship between the nuclear-weapon States and their nuclear arsenals.

There will be those who will argue that nuclear disarmament is a very complicated matter and that the nuclear-weapon States cannot pursue it in a time-bound framework. To be sure, the nuclear arms race and build-up did not follow a script. But it often responded to specific goals that had to be

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attained by a certain date. The efforts to build the first bomb in the 1940s are one example of this. The move from atomic to hydrogen bombs is another. The same thing happened with the development of delivery vehicles, as demonstrated by the history of the evolution of missile technology. In short, if countries developed their nuclear arsenals by earmarking resources for specific projects to be completed by, or at least planned for, a given date, it does not seem unreasonable to ask them to do the same when they build down or dismantle their nuclear arsenals. At the last United Nations General Assembly proposals were put forward on these very issues: the step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and measures aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons. But the resolutions on these and other related questions were opposed by some nuclear-weapon States and a number of countries belonging to the Eastern European and Western European and Others groups.

One might expect that perhaps the nuclear-weapon States would be more forthcoming within the preparatory process for the 1995 NPT Conference. But there has been very little discussion of these issues since the Preparatory Committee first met in 1993. The nuclear-weapon States, supported by other nations, have been reluctant to examine the substantive questions regarding the Conference. During the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee they seemed content to concentrate exclusively on organizational matters, avoiding any debate on substance and preventing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from getting too close to their meeting room. In fact, when it comes to the NPT, some nuclear-weapon States and European countries prefer to distance themselves from NGOs. This attitude is very different from the one they adopt towards those organizations concerned with human rights or environmental issues. In these matters they welcome and even encourage the active participation of the NGOs in their meetings.

It was only at the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee in September last year that we finally had an initial debate on substance. That debate, brief as it was, revealed deep differences in how NPT parties view the 1995 Conference. Many of those that had resisted debating substance are the same countries that for some years now have been calling and campaigning for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. A few of them have even proposed that the 1995 Conference should first decide to extend the NPT indefinitely and then start the discussion on the substantive questions. The logic here is unusual. They would seem to be saying "Extend first and review later", or to put it more bluntly, "Sign now and talk later". The substantive discussion continued last week at the fourth and final meeting of the Preparatory Committee. It is bound to continue in the coming months and will certainly dominate the debate at the Conference itself. As we pointed out a few days ago in New York, the questions that have to be answered are: What are nuclear arsenals for? How do the nuclear-weapon States relate to these arsenals? And how does the rest of the world see that relationship?

When the NPT was concluded in 1968, no one, including the nuclear-weapon States, could have imagined the series of events that have transformed the international landscape since 1989. No one foresaw the end of the cold war or the Soviet Union's demise. When the nuclear-weapon States agreed to the inclusion in the NPT of provisions regarding its periodic review and an

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extension conference after 25 years, they had no idea that this could take place in the present international conditions. And they are scrambling to find cogent arguments to convince the world that it is in everyone's interest to achieve what they have described as its "indefinite and unconditional extension". Obviously with or without the cold war, the NPT's extension would not be an issue if we already had in place a CTBT, legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, an international convention banning any further production of fissile material for military purposes and a specific post-START nuclear disarmament programme. But none of this has happened, and the only thing we hear are calls for the "indefinite and unconditional extension" of a treaty which is far from perfect and is in need of a major overhaul.

The NPT should be examined carefully. Some of its provisions do not appear to pose major problems, while others do not seem to have been complied with fully. There are, however, those which are sources of major differences. These include such questions as peaceful nuclear explosions, which the NPT permits but which a future CTBT will have to prohibit and whether or not the nuclear-weapon States have complied with the nuclear disarmament measures referred to in article VI. Ideally, the NPT parties should review and, where necessary, revise the treaty. But this does not seem possible. Attention and energy are focused on extending it as it is. With the exception of China, the nuclear-weapon States have urged its indefinite and unconditional extension. The European Union has stated that this course of action would be in the security interests of all States. The proponents of that position fear that the NPT will unravel if we try and amend it or place conditions on its extension. However, it is not only a question of the NPT and its extension. The outcome of the 1995 Conference should serve both to strengthen the treaty itself and to build a more genuine, truly universal and non-discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation regime. States do not enter into legally binding international instruments just for fun, and we should not be lackadaisical about their implementation. Countries sign a treaty because they feel that it is in their interest to do so. The question now is whether the NPT's indefinite and unconditional extension is in the interest of its parties. Some think it is; others do not; and there are those that simply do not know.

Will such an extension solve the problems of verifying compliance which the Iraqi case revealed? Will it resolve the present nebulous status of the so-called threshold countries? Will the nuclear-weapon States give adequate security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons? Will there be a halt to the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, and what about existing military and civilian stockpiles? Will it bring about a CTBT and ensure the conclusion of measures aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons? In a word, will indefinite extension further the vertical and horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons? And, more importantly, will it change the attitude and relationship of the nuclear-weapon States to those weapons of mass destruction? And here we return to the moral and legal aspects of nuclear weapons. For years there has been much discussion regarding the lawfulness of nuclear weapons. Three decades ago the United Nations General Assembly began addressing this question and has been considering it since then. There is, for example, an annual resolution calling on the CD to commence negotiations

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on a draft convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances. Moreover, in 1993 the World Health Organization requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the lawfulness of the use of such weapons given their health and environmental effects. At its last session the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a proposal requesting another opinion from the Court on the broader question: is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted, under international law?

The nuclear-weapon States are not very happy with these requests to the ICJ. And the reason seems to be the same as that which has led them to advocate the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. This reveals their true intentions regarding the continued existence of nuclear weapons. While all the nuclear-weapon States have begun to rethink the role of such weapons in the post-cold-war era, the results are neither clear nor encouraging. For decades NATO refused to adopt the doctrine of no first use, arguing that it reserved the right to resort to nuclear weapons if confronted with a massive conventional attack in Europe. They had the USSR in mind. Now the Russians, who for years advocated a policy of no first use, have changed their minds and have embraced the NATO doctrine. They have in mind some of their neighbours. In fact, China is the only nuclear-weapon State that still adheres to a policy of no first use. In October 1993 the United States announced that it would undertake a nuclear posture review that would incorporate policy and doctrine revisions. When the review was released on 22 September 1994, it left its doctrine unchanged, stating that it maintained the option of using nuclear weapons "as a last resort" in response to a non-nuclear attack. Also discouraging is the review's conclusion that there will be no strategic force reductions below the level of 3,500 warheads specified in the START II Treaty until it has been fully implemented, i.e. not before 2003. There is also concern about the statement regarding the possibility of "reconstituting" its strategic forces rapidly by uploading nuclear warheads on its Minuteman III ICBMs and Trident II SLBMs.

When asked to give negative security assurances to our non-nuclear-weapon States, the nuclear-weapon States cannot agree. They are willing to give such assurances to the parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but they hesitate to do the same when it comes to NPT parties. In fact, nuclear-weapon States seem reluctant to give such guarantees to all non-nuclear NPT States. This makes for an interesting exercise in speculation.

There is a third item on which the nuclear-weapon States have been less than candid: a ban on the production of fissile material for warlike purposes. For many years the nuclear-weapon States have been producing highly enriched uranium and plutonium for both military and civilian uses. Now the United States and the Russian Federation have unilaterally ceased production because they simply have too much of this material. The next step is to call for an international ban on such production. What they are seeking is a halt to all future production, but nothing is said about existing stockpiles, including those for civilian reactors which use fissile material that can also have military applications. This has sparked an increasingly heated debate in New York and here in Geneva. Many countries wish to address the question of existing stockpiles of fissile material as well as banning production. And so

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it is that on the eve of the NPT review and extension Conference, a number of fundamental questions remain unanswered. The only clear position taken by four of the five nuclear-weapon States and some of their allies is on the treaty's indefinite and unconditional extension. What they have stated or implied with regard to other issues is not very encouraging. To be sure, their policies are certainly not uniform on such matters as the pace of the CTBT negotiations, peaceful nuclear explosions, the future of nuclear energy for civilian purposes, negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and various other questions. But the overall impression they give is that of business as usual. The cold war may be over and - yes - the strategic nuclear competition between the United States and the Russian Federation shows signs of abating, but the relationship of the nuclear-weapon States with their own nuclear weapons has not registered the kind of basic change that one might expect. They continue to rely on nuclear weapons and do not seem very prepared to give them up in the foreseeable future. Quite the contrary - they are looking for ways to freeze the NPT's dichotomy between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots. And this does not bode well either for the NPT or for nuclear non-proliferation in general.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words which he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America , Ambassador Ralph Earle, Deputy Director of the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Mr. EARLE (United States of America): Mr. President, first, on behalf of the United States delegation I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in this year of such critical importance for arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. I would also like to join in welcoming the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Walter Gardini, to whose important statement we have listened with great care. For my own part, I am pleased to return to Geneva after many years of association with this city in strategic arms control and disarmament negotiations. I am especially pleased to be sent by the President of the United States to address you at the opening of this new round of negotiations to end the testing of nuclear weapons for all time.

The world has changed dramatically since my work here in the 1970s on bilateral strategic nuclear arms talks. With the passing of the bipolar conflict between West and East, the agenda and global focus of this Conference encompass the priority disarmament issues facing the world today. With the achievements of the non-proliferation Treaty, the biological and toxin weapons Convention, the chemical weapons Convention, and other agreements as prologue, the Conference on Disarmament is now, as we say, "where the action is" for test ban, for cutting off fissile material production for weapons, and for transparency in armaments.

One of the foremost goals of the United States is completing the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the earliest possible date. I have the honour to convey to you three decisions made by President Clinton this past weekend that underscore his determination to achieve as much progress as possible in the test-ban negotiations before the NPT review and

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extension Conference convenes in April. First, on the assumption that a treaty will be signed before 30 September 1996, and subject to the same understandings that govern our current moratorium, the President has decided to extend the moratorium on American nuclear tests until a CTB treaty enters into force. Second, the President has directed Ambassador Ledogar to propose that the Conference on Disarmament remain in session until September if the negotiation is not concluded during the round now scheduled to end in April. Third, the President has directed that the United States will withdraw its proposal for a special "right to withdraw" from the CTB treaty 10 years after it enters into force. Let me also note that the CTB will contain a traditional "supreme national interest" clause. In articulating his national security strategy last July, President Clinton declared that the United States will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests. In this regard, the President considers the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States.

In his remarks to a conference in Washington, D.C., on 30 January 1995, the National Security Advisor to President Clinton, The Honourable Anthony Lake, pointed out that one of the most complicated and challenging issues in the CTB negotiations is the question of what kinds of experiments and other stockpile stewardship activities will be permitted under the treaty, what are termed "activities not treaty-prohibited". In that connection, the United States position with regard to these activities is determined on the basis of three criteria. First, the CTB treaty must be comprehensive and it must promote our vital national interest in curbing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons; second, the CTB treaty must not prohibit activities required to maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile; and finally, the CTB treaty must be signed by all declared nuclear-weapon States and as many other nations as possible. As the negotiations proceed, the United States will continue to review its position on this issue to ensure that the treaty meets these criteria.

In my statement today, I want to relate President Clinton's decisions on a comprehensive test ban to the broader international security context for this initiative. The long and difficult history of efforts to achieve a test ban is well known to this body. There were times in the past when success seemed within reach, particularly in the early 1960s, and again in the late 1970s. Valuable partial agreements were achieved during those years - the limited test-ban Treaty, the threshold test-ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties. But the international environment was not yet ripe for success. Now the cold war is for historians to study. Strategic stability is strong. The threat of nuclear and conventional conflict between West and East is at its lowest level in decades. We can be immensely grateful that the persistently upward spiral in numbers of nuclear weapons has at last been reversed. Historic progress was made in 1994 with the entry into force of the START I Treaty. The United States has already launched an aggressive effort to ratify the START II Treaty, which will codify dramatically lower United States and Russian strategic force levels. This includes the removal of more than 14,000 nuclear weapons from missiles and bombers. With respect

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to our aggressive efforts to ratify the Treaty, in fact in about five hours, Secretary Christopher will be testifying on that subject before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Yet, the nuclear genie is not back in the bottle. In addition to the nuclear-weapon States, a number of so-called "threshold" States possess unregulated nuclear capabilities. Uncontrolled quantities of fissile materials, both plutonium and highly enriched uranium, constitute a clear and present danger. With regard to conventional conflict, our largely peaceful world has tragically bleak elements: in Rwanda, in Bosnia, in Somalia, and elsewhere. The use of heavy and light conventional weapons, and the suffering caused by land-mines, are all too real. Clearly, our task of building and strengthening the structures of international arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament is far from over.

In this broader context, concluding the comprehensive test-ban negotiations on which you have made such a good start in 1994 is an imperative for my Government. President Clinton's decision to extend our moratorium on nuclear testing is a decision by the United States to adhere to a comprehensive test ban. The work before us is to codify this decision, and similar decisions by others, in a treaty of unlimited duration and ultimately universal adherence.

You may ask: Why is a CTBT important now? Because it will permanently and significantly constrain the further development of nuclear explosive capabilities by the established nuclear-weapon States. Because it will set in place a high barrier to advancing the development of nuclear-weapons technologies of threshold States that might seek more sophisticated capabilities. Miniaturization and improved deliverability of advanced designs are aspects of nuclear-weapons development well worth constraining. And in the broader international political framework, the CTB will represent a most important building block in the enduring structure of non-proliferation that we seek to erect.

The United States recognizes the importance of the CTBT to both nuclear and non-nuclear States for achieving global non-proliferation objectives. In particular, we recognize the important contribution that the CTBT makes to fulfilling the obligations of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty under its article VI. But the United States firmly believes there should be no linkage between conclusion of the CTBT negotiations and the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, which is itself a vital building block of global nuclear stability. The NPT is too important to regional and global security to hold it hostage to completion of other arms control measures.

During 1994, the Conference on Disarmament registered remarkable progress in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, under the leadership of Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico. In just this one year, the Conference has demonstrated its commitment to the negotiations by producing a rolling text for the treaty, by carrying out inter-sessional work, and by reaching substantial agreement in the area of verification. The progress to date is, we believe, essentially irreversible. It is probable that, despite

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further progress in this body between now and April, there will remain parts of the CTBT and its protocol still to negotiate. The United States delegation is here to negotiate the CTBT now, and it will be here in full force after the NPT review and extension Conference to complete any remaining tasks. We need to maintain and even accelerate the rapid pace set in last year's session and work with real urgency to have an agreed text that this body can forward to the General Assembly. It would be altogether fitting if that welcome event would occur in this silver anniversary of the NPT, which is also the golden anniversary of the United Nations.

As an instrument for constraining nuclear-weapons development and proliferation, the test ban needs as parties the five nuclear-weapon States as well as other countries. We seek universal adherence to the CTBT, and have joined in the consensus adoption of two United Nations General Assembly resolutions in support of this objective. But, we also believe that entry into force of the CTBT should not be unduly delayed because of the recalcitrance of any individual State that might be tempted for essentially mischievous reasons to obstruct the will of a larger number of States. Thus the NTB Ad Hoc Committee should seek provisions that bring about early entry into force of the treaty, with the five declared nuclear-weapons States, while at the same time promoting the widest possible adherence to the agreement.

We welcome the significant progress made in 1994 in agreeing on the verification regime for the CTBT. As we see it, there will be four carefully designed and interrelated components, or "pillars", as we call them, in this regime. In the United States view, there should be a robust but cost-effective international collection and exchange of data, derived from networks of remote sensors employing seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide and infrasound techniques. This exchange should provide a wealth of information that would enable the detection, and permit the identification, of attempts to evade the ban on testing down to levels of a few kilotons or below. But there will remain instances when ambiguities are not successfully resolved by the States parties, based on data from the international monitoring system, or when other information suggests a party has attempted to evade the test ban. The treaty should, therefore, as a second "pillar", provide for a system of quick-acting, mandatory on-site inspections. This system would help reduce uncertainties, and provide a responsive and technically competent means of confirming the occurrence of a nuclear explosion. A third "pillar" would consist of a package of so-called "associated measures" designed to facilitate the exchange of information that might help resolve ambiguities, for example concerning events detected by the networks of remote sensors. And fourth, there would be an international implementing body whose roles and competencies are clearly defined and directed at facilitating the smooth and efficient functioning of the other three "pillars". Taken together with treaty provisions for consultation and clarification, and with national means of verification available to treaty parties, these four "pillars" should provide an effective deterrent to cheating. In the event deterrence fails, they also should provide effective capabilities to establish whether cheating in fact had taken place.

The United States recognizes that the verification arrangements will not be cost-free. We are prepared to accept a fair share of the costs for

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establishing and operating the international monitoring system, and "associated measures" necessary to make the CTBT an effective international instrument for nuclear stability. But we also look to other members of the international community, who will benefit from the final achievement of the CTBT, readily to shoulder their own share of these costs. Compared with those of military forces, these costs are modest indeed.

I want to turn to another high-priority issue on the arms control agenda which has already been mentioned - a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosives. A fissile material cut-off treaty is a key element in curbing nuclear arms and reducing nuclear risks worldwide. It would cap the amount of material available for nuclear weapons, reinforcing the nuclear-weapons States' commitment to nuclear arms reduction, and reducing nuclear risks in other regions as well. It would extend international safeguards to new facilities. It would be an essential step toward farther-reaching arms control in the future. President Clinton has attached considerable importance to achieving as soon as possible a global, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable cut-off treaty. The United States, like many others, regrets that negotiations have not already begun. The informal workshop graciously hosted by the Government of Canada earlier this month helped clarify some of the issues that need to be dealt with. But nothing can take the place of negotiations. We hope the CD promptly adopts a mandate that enables them to begin. A cap on future production of fissile material for nuclear explosives is possible in the relatively shot term, and it would mark a major milestone in making the world a safer place. It would help advance progress on other multilateral and regional arms control and non-proliferation measures. And it would constitute an important measure toward implementing the obligations of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty under article VI. To try to link such a cap to capturing already existing unsafeguarded fissile material stocks in various countries would be a recipe for endless disputes - while stocks in some States would continue to grow. So, together, we must act and act soon. This body faces an unprecedented challenge: namely, to negotiate two major treaties in parallel. A CTBT is of the highest priority, but a cut-off treaty must be given high priority at the same time. This challenge requires us all to summon substantial energy and resources and to rededicate ourselves to the goals that we are here to serve.

In less than three months many of the countries represented in this Conference will convene to review and decide on the extension of a most important treaty for stability and security in the nuclear era. The non-proliferation Treaty was negotiated in this forum, as were other signal accomplishments such as the biological and toxin weapons Convention, and the chemical weapons Convention. This structure of constraints represents our best hope for a safer world, for a viable alternative to military means of security. The NPT, I am confident, will be extended indefinitely and without conditions. It will be so extended because its parties will decide that the NPT is in their own best interests and the best interests of the international community. The parties will decide to secure their future against the nightmare of proliferation, and to create the conditions for even further progress toward the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons enshrined in article VI.

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This Conference can be proud of its accomplishments. It can be proud of its success story that the NPT truly is, a treaty that has, since 1990, been adhered to by Algeria, Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Ukraine, and many other States. But the Conference's work is not finished. The CTBT will not be concluded without intensive negotiations in Geneva, and significant decisions in capitals. That is why the United States proposes today that after the NPT review and extension Conference, the CD negotiate continuously into September to conclude this highest-priority task. Our delegation is prepared to resume work after the review and extension Conference concludes, and remain here until we are finished. We recognize the difficulties this poses for many countries, but the stakes are very high. President Clinton has extended the moratorium on United States testing in the confident expectation that your work will rapidly conclude. We are prepared to proceed.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. We have come to the end of the list of speakers for today. However, the representative of Japan wants to take the floor, so I give it to him.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Mr. President, I wish to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at the beginning of its 1995 session. I trust in your able and accommodating leadership at this most challenging time when we have to bring about the smooth start of the deliberations of the Conference on the important issues before us. I should also like to extend my warm welcome to Mr. Walter Gardini, Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy, and Ambassador Ralph Earle, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States of America.

I asked for the floor to register the appreciation of the delegation of Japan for the statement just made by Ambassador Earle, the Deputy Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. My delegation welcomes and shares the devotion and determination of his Government to conclude the CTBT negotiations at the earliest possible date and, in particular, welcomes the important decision to extend further its nuclear testing moratorium until the entry into force of the CTBT, as well as the decision to withdraw its proposal allowing the easy withdrawal of the States parties from the treaty on the occasion of the review conference, which we fear might jeopardize the CTBT negotiations. We have already made substantial progress in our CTBT negotiations under the able leadership of Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico, Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee last year. We hope that these particular initiatives made by the United States Government at the very beginning of this year's CD session will definitely contribute to further progress of our negotiations bringing them to an early and successful conclusion.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, I shall now give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, who will make a statement on the subject of the services allocated to the Conference.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The secretariat is mandated by the General Assembly to report to the Conference on the services to be assigned to it during the 1995 session. As in previous sessions, the Conference will be allocated 10 meetings per week with full services, and 15 meetings per week with full services during the sessions of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. In other words, we should be able to hold two daily meetings with full services throughout the whole of the 1995 session, plus one additional daily meeting when the seismic Group is in session.

I am sure I need not remind you that the United Nations continues to face a serious financial crisis. It is therefore incumbent on us to make the best possible use of the resources allocated to us. In this respect, I should like to remind delegations that, during 1994, over 200 hours of budgeted meeting time were unutilized due to either late starting, early finishing or cancellation of meetings. I should like to call on you all to show maximum cooperation and flexibility in using all the time allocated to the Conference. For example, as the work of the Conference intensifies, it may be necessary to hold meetings of subsidiary bodies consecutively. This practice has in the past prevented the waste of allocated resources in the event of early adjournment of meetings. Punctuality in starting meetings is important. It is also understood that meetings with full services cannot be held in the evening or during weekends.

The situation with regard to documentation in the United Nations has now reached a critical stage. The volume of documentation has spiralled upward beyond the capacity of Conference Services to process it in a timely manner. I wish to recall, again, that the measures accepted by the Conference at the informal meeting held on 22 April 1986 concerning savings in documentation continue to be valid. In order to implement these decisions, all documents need to be presented well in advance and duplication of documentation should be avoided. In addition, I wish to recall the statement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Fifth Committee on 26 August 1993, in which he stressed that in view of the financial situation of the United Nations, no efforts should be spared in exercising restraint in meetings and documentation.

I would also like to remind delegations to submit as soon as possible their letters of accreditation so that we may issue passes granting access to the Conference rooms, as well as the list of participants. Delegates are kindly requested to carry with them either their CD passes or at least the identification provided by the United Nations Office at Geneva.

With regard to conference room facilities available for the CD, they will be the Council Chamber, room 1, room C-108, room III and the secretariat conference room on the sixth floor. When delegations need such facilities for their consultations, I wish to suggest that, in order to avoid any overlapping, they kindly address a request to the Conference Officer, Ms. Pasqualin, who is responsible for coordinating and assigning such services.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference for his statement. As announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting, I now propose to suspend the plenary meeting and to convene an informal meeting to examine the requests for participation in our work from non-member States of the Conference, and to consider the draft Presidential statement on the agenda and the organization of our work.

The meeting was suspended at 12.10 p.m. and resumed at 1.10 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 693rd plenary meeting is resumed. I would like to embark on consideration of the requests for participation received from States that are not members of the Conference in the work of this session. These requests are contained in document CD/WP.460, distributed today and come from the following States: Armenia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ghana, Greece, the Holy See, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, the Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. May I take it that the Conference decides to invite these States to participate in our work.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The representative of Chile has asked for the floor to make a brief statement. I give him the floor.

Mr. BERGUÑO (Chile) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I would like, before reading a statement by a group of non-member States, to associate myself with the important statements made on the very topic by the Under-Secretary of State of Italy and also the statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations communicated to us by Mr. Petrovsky, as well as the well-merited tribute to Ambassador Lampreia.

(continued in English)

I would like to make the following statement in the name of Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

The Conference on Disarmament is, once more, confronted with the need to reach a consensus leading to the expansion of its membership, in order to respond to its own decisions and to the successive resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly demanding a substantial enlargement of its composition.

(Mr. Berguño, Chile)

Now, for the first time, although retaining in the annual resolution on the report of the Conference on Disarmament (resolution 49/77 C) a paragraph urging the Conference to make every effort to reach a solution on the expansion of its membership by the beginning of 1995, the General Assembly has adopted a specific resolution on the issue of expansion (resolution 49/77 B).

The more specific resolution on expansion contains, in its operative paragraphs, terms of reference which, while recognizing the legitimate aspirations of all candidate countries, recommend a significant expansion of the Conference's composition which would then include at least 60 countries. In a logical order, the United Nation General Assembly resolution draws attention to the relevant documents intended to guide us in this endeavour:

The report of 12 August 1993 of the Special Coordinator for membership, already acknowledged by the General Assembly since it had been introduced at its forty-eighth session as an integral part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament;

The subsequent statement made by the Special Coordinator on 23 August 1993, recommending a dynamic solution to the question of membership;

The report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1994 session, reflecting the intention of the Conference to reinstate its own procedures providing for periodic review of its membership.

We are confident that the appropriate procedures will be found to materialize the consensus embodied in the above-mentioned resolutions into a formal decision of the Conference on Disarmament on its composition for the 1995 session.

The completion of this long-delayed process must be achieved with a certain sense of urgency, now, within certain constraints, of time that brook no extension. In this context, resolution 49/77 B enhances the merits of an enlarged membership, in order to negotiate, on the solid basis of more representative participation, a comprehensive test-ban treaty and other important agreements requiring universal adherence.

(continued in Spanish)

I wish to request you to include this statement among the official documents of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Chile for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

(The President)

During the informal meeting we had a productive exchange of views on the content of the draft Presidential statement on the agenda and the organization of our work. However, it seems to be necessary to pursue our consultations so that we can reach a consensus as soon as possible.

As we have come to the end of the agenda, I shall adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 2 February 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.